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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF “CLINICAL INTEGRATION:”  
AN ANALYSIS OF FTC STAFF’S ADVISORY OPINION TO 
MEDSOUTH 
THOMAS B. LEARY* 
This Article will focus on a single fourteen-page letter from an Assistant 
Director in the Federal Trade Commission’s (hereinafter referred to as 
“Commission”) Bureau of Competition to a law firm in Washington, D.C., in 
response to that law firm’s request for an advisory opinion on a business 
proposal.1  MedSouth, Inc., a physician independent practice association, 
located in Denver, Colorado, proposed to integrate partially the practices of its 
members and to negotiate for their services collectively with payors.  Counsel 
for the association wanted to know whether Commission staff would 
recommend an antitrust challenge.  Staff advised that it would not recommend 
a challenge, but that it would monitor future developments.2 
The resulting staff opinion is worthy of study for a number of reasons.  
First, the opinion provides a useful discussion of general antitrust principles 
applicable to joint ventures.  Second, it is the first opinion that applies the so-
called “clinical integration” test under the joint DOJ/FTC Statements of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care.3  Third, if the MedSouth 
experiment succeeds, it could have a profound effect on the future evolution of 
managed care. 
 
* Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission.  This article is an expanded version of a speech 
delivered at the Saint Louis University Health Law Symposium on April 12, 2002.  The views 
expressed are individual, and not necessarily shared by other Commissioners.  I acknowledge the 
assistance of my advisor, Holly L. Vedova. 
 1. Letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Director, Health Care Services & Products, 
FTC, to John J. Miles, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver (February 19, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcadops/medsouth.htm [hereinafter MedSouth Staff Opinion].  The Commission’s advisory 
opinion process allows interested parties to request advice from the Commission with respect to a 
course of action that the requesting party proposes to pursue.  In practice, most advisory opinions 
are staff letters.  The Commission’s advisory opinion procedure is contained in 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-
1.4 (1993). 
 2. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,153, 
at §§ (8)(B)-(C) (Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS].  A number of previous 
opinions have discussed “financial integration.” 
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The article will discuss the background, the rationale and the implications 
of this opinion letter, with consideration of complicating factors. 
I.  BACKGROUND SETTING 
A. Special Economic Factors 
The antitrust analysis of a joint venture proposed by health care providers 
must take account of the special characteristics of the marketplace in which 
they operate.  Most notable is the fact that people who seek medical treatment 
normally do not directly and individually pay for the full cost of the treatment.  
They may pay a great deal for health care, indirectly and collectively through 
insurance premiums and taxes, but these payments are not associated with 
particular services.  The incremental costs of the services to insured patients 
may be close to zero.  This means that these people tend to “over-consume” 
health care services.4 
Health care providers (like doctors) have a corresponding incentive to 
“over-supply” some services, to the extent they are paid for each procedure or 
test that they supply.5  This tendency to “over-supply” will not be disciplined 
by patients, who have neither the specialized knowledge to recognize it, nor 
the incentive to do anything about it.  Someone has to perform a gatekeeper 
function to moderate these mutually reinforcing tendencies to over-supply and 
to over-consume. 
In countries with socialized medicine, the gates are tended by the state and 
care is rationed by a queue; in the United States, the gates are tended by private 
entities like Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”) and care is rationed 
according to their guidelines.  Neither system is popular. 
The basic problem is that people can comprehend the need to reduce health 
care expenditures in the aggregate, and recognize that some gatekeeping is 
necessary, but we all tend to assign an almost infinite value to the life of any 
identifiable person. There will always be individual horror stories, where 
public or private gatekeepers appear to have acted callously, and no group is 
more outraged by these incidents than people in the provider community—who 
have firsthand experience with many of them and a powerful ethical 
commitment to individuals in their care. 
These providers have a legitimate incentive to engage in collective action 
that will increase their bargaining power on issues that relate to the quality of 
care.  The problem is that, like any other group, providers also have a less 
legitimate incentive to engage in collective action that will increase their own 
 
 4. See, e.g., David M. Cutler, A Guide to Health Care Reform, 8 J.  ECON. PERSP. 13 
(1994). 
 5. Doctors may also be tempted to practice “defensive medicine” (that is, excessive tests 
and procedures)  to reduce the risk of malpractice claims.  Id. at 16. 
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income.6  The challenge for antitrust is to distinguish between collective 
conduct that primarily addresses a legitimate objective and conduct that does 
not, recognizing there may be spillover effects and the future is always 
uncertain.  This is not just a technical legal problem because an antitrust policy 
that is perceived to be overly aggressive is likely to be tempered by a strong 
political response.7 
B. General Antitrust Principles 
The applicable legal standards also contain some internal anomalies.  
Virtually all antitrust cases involve the activities of a number of people, but it 
makes a significant difference in the analysis if these activities are deemed to 
be the work of a single entity or a combination of separate entities.  The critical 
question is whether there is or is not an “efficiency-enhancing integration of 
economic activity.”8  The anomaly is that the distinction between the two 
categories can involve some close judgements up-front,9 but thereafter the 
analysis proceeds in a very different way.  As a practical matter, these delicate 
up-front distinctions may ultimately be outcome determinative. 
Specifically, a group of doctors can probably negotiate collectively with 
payers about payment terms if they meet the criteria for treatment as a single 
entity, but they are guilty of a per se antitrust violation if they do not meet the 
criteria.10  Before considering this issue in greater depth, it is necessary to look 
at the substance of the MedSouth proposal. 
II.  THE MEDSOUTH FACTS AND THE STAFF OPINION 
MedSouth, Inc. is an independent practice association in Denver, 
Colorado, that currently includes about 450 doctors who practice in the fields 
of primary care and forty specialties and sub-specialties.  This group of doctors 
proposes to coordinate activities by sharing clinical information; coordinating 
 
 6. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 7. See Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small 
Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 
212-13 (2001); John J. Miles, Joint Venture Analysis and Provider—Controlled Health Care 
Networks, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 152 (1997). 
 8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
13,161, at § 1.2 (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter COLLABORATION GUIDELINES]. 
 9. Cf. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Once one 
goes beyond the classic single enterprise . . . it is difficult to find an easy stopping point or even 
decide on the proper functional criteria for hybrid cases.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Obstetrics and Gynecology Med. Corp. of Napa Valley,  No. C-4048, 2002 WL 
1005063 (FTC May 14, 2002); Physician Integrated Serv. of Denver, Inc., No. 0110173, 2002 
WL 988023 (FTC May 14, 2002); Aurora Associated Primary Care Physicians, L.L.C., No. 
0110174, 2002 WL 988024 (FTC May 14, 2002).    
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treatment, particularly the interface between primary care doctors and 
specialists; developing practice protocols; and monitoring the compliance of 
individuals in the group.  The stated objectives are to improve patient 
outcomes, decrease use of physician resources and provide MedSouth with a 
competitive advantage over other practices in the area. 
Prices for treatment will be collectively negotiated with payers, but doctors 
will bill individually and directly on a fee-for-service basis.  MedSouth will not 
negotiate capitated contracts or share profits of a joint enterprise.  However, 
the venture will be non-exclusive, and members can contract individually with 
payers who do not choose to negotiate with the group. 
In response to MedSouth’s request for an advisory opinion, FTC staff 
followed the analytical process described above in Section I.B. and concluded 
that a “per se analysis would not be appropriate in evaluating MedSouth’s 
proposed course of conduct.”11  The rationale for this conclusion was that the 
proposed plan “appears to involve partial integration among MedSouth 
physicians that has the potential to increase the quality and reduce the cost of 
medical care.”12  In addition, the staff opined that the proposed “joint 
contracting appears to be sufficiently related to, and reasonably necessary for, 
the achievement of the potential benefits to be regarded as ancillary to the 
operation of the venture.”13 
The integration rationale is specifically addressed in the Health Care 
Statements and there have been a substantial number of previous staff opinions 
to the same effect.14  However, the previous opinions were based on a 
prediction that financial risk sharing would provide the incentives for the 
achievement of substantial efficiencies.15  In MedSouth, for the first time, the 
opinion addressed a venture with no (or trivial) financial risk sharing and relied 
on so-called “clinical integration” to yield the expected efficiencies.16  Note 
that the underlying justification for a “financial integration” and a “clinical 
integration” test is similar (potential for improved efficiencies), but the former 
seems to rely on the existence of incentives to improve whereas the latter 
seems to rely on the stated plans for improvement. 
The staff opinion’s further conclusion that joint contracting with payers 
should be treated as an ancillary restriction will be discussed below.  The 
bottom line is that this finding, along with the application of a clinical 
integration test, justifies a rule-of-reason analysis of the venture.  In my view, 
this conclusion is consistent with the Commission’s own guidelines and policy 
 
 11. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. A list of health care antitrust advisory opinions by Commission and staff is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/advisory.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002). 
 15. See HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § (8)(A)(4). 
 16. See id. at § (8)(B). 
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statements, and mandated by applicable case law.17  The difficult issue that the 
opinion does not tackle is precisely how a subsequent rule-of-reason inquiry 
would proceed.  Discussion of this issue would be speculative because the 
venture was only in the proposal stage and because there have been no 
subsequent rule-of-reason challenges to ventures that were given comparable 
comfort.  There was no particular need for staff to embark on this speculative 
exercise, but that is what this article will now attempt to do. 
III.  CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN A TWO-STEP ANALYSIS 
There is something anomalous about the whole idea of a “two-step” 
analysis that involves, first, a determination whether rule-of-reason treatment is 
appropriate and, second, an analysis under the rule of reason.  One problem is 
that it may be necessary to look at some aspects of “reasonableness” in the first 
step, as well.  The MedSouth opinion letter, for example, refers to the 
efficiency-enhancing “potential” of the proposed venture, which requires the 
exercise of some judgment, and then goes on to find that joint contracting 
“appears to be sufficiently related . . . and reasonably necessary.”18  Factual 
judgment is needed to support a conclusion that a fuller examination of the 
facts is necessary. 
This seemingly awkward process is not unique.  For example,  a tying case 
requires an initial inquiry into factual issues like market power and product 
definition before deciding whether per se or rule-of-reason treatment is 
appropriate.19  Similarly, the National Cooperative Research and Production 
Act provides that certain joint ventures qualify for rule-of-reason treatment,20 
but the statutory definition excludes those ventures that will exchange sensitive 
information “not reasonably required to carry out the purpose of the venture.”21 
A reasonableness test to determine whether to apply the rule-of-reason 
raises interesting questions in the context of a nascent venture like MedSouth, 
when no one knows whether certain assumptions will prove to be true.  What 
happens if some plans for clinical integration are not carried out or predicted 
quality improvements do not materialize?  As a matter of strict logic the 
venture should be deemed per se illegal—perhaps even retroactively.  Since 
findings of per se illegality can have serious collateral consequences, this 
appears to be a harsh sanction for failure to fulfill a business plan.  On the 
other hand, if the consequences are not serious, there may be a perverse 
incentive for ventures to promise innovations that they have no intention of 
implementing.  It may be that the best option in this hypothetical circumstance 
 
 17. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 18. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 19. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (2000). 
 21. Id. § 4301(b)(1). 
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would be to simply withdraw the opinion letter in light of changed 
circumstances, and, thereafter, the venture would be subject to per se 
condemnation if it did not modify its behavior. 
There is another awkward feature of a two-step analysis.  Regardless of the 
verbal formulation, I am not sure the human mind is capable of reasoning in so 
disciplined a way—at least, when it is necessary to take the two steps in close 
sequence.  A decision-maker cannot help forming an overall impression and 
this sense of the ultimate destination may affect an analysis in step I.  Actually, 
the impression could cut either way; a decision-maker might be particularly 
generous to the venture in step I, knowing that it would fail the analysis in step 
II.  Thus, the law on the distinctions between per se and rule-of-reason 
offenses could be subtly distorted. 
This anomaly is less problematic when, as here, the step I analysis in the 
MedSouth opinion will be separated in time from a full inquiry that might be 
conducted down the road.  When deciding step I, staff did not have any sense 
of how the facts, relevant in a step II inquiry, would play out.22  As will 
become clear from the discussion below, however, these issues will not go 
away entirely if there are later proceedings because step II also involves a 
number of individual steps. 
IV.  ANALYSIS UNDER THE RULE-OF-REASON IN STEP II 
Once it is determined in step I that rule-of-reason treatment is appropriate, 
the decision-maker in most cases will move promptly to step II, the actual rule-
of-reason analysis. In cases like MedSouth, where step I has been completed 
before the venture is even up and running, the step II analysis may be separated 
by a period of years, if it is undertaken at all.  Nevertheless, it may be useful to 
examine some of the issues that would arise in a step II inquiry into a venture 
like MedSouth, because such an inquiry is bound to occur in the future. 
The general framework for a step II rule-of-reason inquiry is set out in the 
Collaboration Guidelines.23  This inquiry may itself proceed in a stepwise 
fashion.  The first step typically will involve market definition and calculation 
of market shares.  If the market shares are low enough, the inquiry can stop at 
this point.  (For physician joint ventures specifically, market share “safety 
zones” of twenty percent for exclusive ventures, and thirty percent for non-
exclusive ventures, are specified in the separate Health Care Policy 
 
 22. For similar reasons, I do not believe it is all that difficult for a Federal Trade 
Commissioner to distinguish between a “reason-to-believe” that a complaint should issue and a 
later determination on the merits.  However, I do believe that existing case law on the “reason-to-
believe” standard is not particularly helpful—a subject for a different paper. 
 23. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at §§ 1.2, 3.3; HEALTH CARE 
STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § (8)(B)(2) (requiring a similar four step approach). 
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Statements.)24  If further inquiry is needed, the second step will be to “examine 
whether the relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve 
procompetitive benefits that likely would offset anticompetitive harms.”25  
Note that this formulation combines elements that are sometimes expressed 
separately as two additional steps: one is the balance of likely anticompetitive 
harm and procompetitive benefits, and another is the issue of whether a less 
restrictive alternative is available.26 
Each of these two (or three) steps in the rule-of-reason analysis will raise 
interesting issues in the context of a venture like MedSouth.  The discussion 
below will be organized as if there were three steps. 
A. Markets and Market Shares 
The apparent “market share” of a venture like Medsouth obviously 
depends on the geographic area considered and how the various specialties are 
broken down.  The staff opinion letter did not attempt a rigorous analysis of 
this issues, but instead referred to some worst-case shares as illustrations  (for 
example, the letter states: “In a number of specialties, they [MedSouth] 
constitute half or more of the physicians with admitting privileges at the three 
hospitals in south Denver.”).27 
A rigorous analysis was not deemed necessary for a step I decision on 
whether to apply a per se or a rule-of-reason test.  But what would happen if 
the shares had been substantially different?  If the shares were lower, the 
venture might fall within a “safety zone” or require only a cursory analysis for 
approval.28  The outcome in the converse situation is less clear because there is 
no express upper-limit “danger zone” that balances the lower limit safety zones 
in the Health Care Statements.  At very high percentages, it could be difficult 
to overcome a strong market-share presumption in a step II rule-of-reason 
inquiry,29 and it would be appropriate for a hypothetical opinion letter to 
highlight this caveat. 
There are other potential difficulties in a complete analysis that the opinion 
letter did not need to address such as, “How do you measure the ‘market share’ 
 
 24. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § (8)(A). 
 25. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at § 3.3. 
 26. See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 75-76 (5th 
ed. 2002). 
 27. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 28. See HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at §§ (8)(A), (8)(B)(4). 
 29. The examples of high-share ventures in Health Care Statements impliedly suggest that 
collective negotiation of fee-for-service rates would be problematic.  See HEALTH CARE 
STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at §§ (8)(C)(6)-(7).  See also Thomas B. Leary, An Inside Look at the 
Heinz Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2002, at 32 (discussing the formidable hurdles that face parties 
who propose 3-2 or 2-1 mergers).  
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of a physicians’ association anyway?” and “What is the significance of either a 
growing or declining share?” 
The opinion letter estimated “shares” based on the number of doctors in 
various specialties affiliated with the venture divided by the total number of 
doctors in these specialties in the appropriate geographic region.  Leaving 
aside the problem of defining the geographic market—a complex issue with 
lore and learning of its own30—there is a question whether it is useful to assign 
shares by counting doctors.  If there are qualitative differences between the 
doctors in the venture and those outside (and there well might be if the clinical 
integration is successful) shares measured by headcount do not accurately 
reflect the real competitive significance of the venture. 
Another problem is a headcount measure may make it more difficult to 
decide an ultimate issue in the case.  An ultimate issue is whether a particular 
venture has either a history of, or a potential ability to, reducing output and 
increasing prices.  In the usual case, the number used to compute a market 
share (units or dollars, as appropriate) is also a measure of output, but that is 
not the case here.  You cannot measure the output of a venture like MedSouth 
by counting doctors.  In fact, as will be discussed below, you probably cannot 
just count tests or procedures performed. 
The incongruity of a headcount tally is highlighted by one aspect of the 
Staff Opinion that may be troublesome down the road.  The opinion seems to 
draw comfort from the fact that “MedSouth expects that . . . it will represent 
fewer physicians in negotiations with payers than currently are members.”31  A 
prediction that members will drift away runs contrary to another prediction that 
provides the justification for rule-of-reason treatment, namely, the expectation 
that clinical integration will result in better care and “provide MedSouth with a 
competitive advantage.”32  You would think the venture would attract more 
members and grow larger if this prediction held true.  After all, the success of 
any enterprise is frequently measured by its growth or “market acceptance.”  
On the other hand, there could be a less benign explanation for an increase in 
membership—doctors might be attracted to the venture simply because they 
want to be able to bargain collectively. 
Note also that if the venture succeeds, its members will presumably 
acquire knowledge of superior diagnostic and treatment methods, and some of 
that knowledge will be portable.  If these members drift away, there will be an 
 
 30. Cf. Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 671, 685-92 (2000).  The article discusses the difficulties of defining geographic market, and 
in particular, the use of patient-flow data, in the context of hospital mergers.  The analysis of the 
proper “market” for a physician’s venture might be done in a similar way, and the challenges 
could be even greater with physicians, whose offices can be spread out over a large geographic 
area.  Id. 
 31. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 32. Id. 
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ever-increasing “free-rider” problem that could ultimately reduce incentives 
for continued improvement.  So, the prospect of a reduced “market share,” 
however measured, is here an ambiguous fact.  There are more such 
ambiguous facts. 
B. The Attainment of Efficiencies 
It is one thing to decide that a proposed business plan facially holds 
promise to satisfy a “clinical integration” requirement.  The prediction may be 
hazy, but the predicted effects of “financial integration” are just as hazy, and 
the FTC’s own guidelines make a decision unavoidable.  But, when the time 
comes, how does a finder of fact decide whether the efficiencies have 
outweighed the anticompetitive effects of collective action? 
As stated above, the ultimate question is whether the venture has raised 
prices and reduced output.  In the usual case, the two have a reciprocal 
relationship but, at least, they can be separately identified.  The relevant 
numbers are the units produced and the price per unit.  The situation here is 
more muddled. 
The difficulty of measuring output by counting doctors has been discussed 
above.  Suppose, hypothetically, that instead of measuring output by counting 
doctors, output was measured by the number of tests and procedures performed 
by individual doctors.  The trouble with this measure is that the unusual 
economics of health care creates incentives for the oversupply of these 
services,33 and a reduction could well be an indication that the venture has 
improved the quality of patient care or the health of patients.  Better informed 
and more confident doctors may be able to diagnose with fewer tests and better 
preventive care may result in fewer procedures.  The apparent “output” 
reduction could be an efficiency, which suggests the need for some quality 
adjustments, at the least, or perhaps a more fundamental reorientation to view 
the quantum of services rendered as an input rather than an output. 
Given the problems in measuring output, suppose a fact finder were to 
focus directly on prices.  The issues here could also be equally difficult.  The 
Commission encountered situations where there was a relatively rapid increase 
in the price of a venture’s services that was obviously attributable to an 
increase in collective bargaining power rather than improved quality.34  These 
cases are easy.  But, what if prices changed slowly over time and there is 
evidence the venture implemented innovative programs to provide better care? 
In these situations, the fact the per-capita income of the association 
members has increased, or the prices per test or procedure has increased, may 
not prove the exercise of market power.  Wholly apart from the quality 
 
 33. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 34. See, e.g., Tex. Surgeons, P.A., No. C-3944, 2000 WL 66997 (FTC May 18, 2000); Wis. 
Chiropractic Ass’n., No. C-3942, 2000 WL 670031 (FTC May 18, 2000). 
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dimension, prices could be increasing across the board.  Even if the market 
worked efficiently, this would not be surprising—people in an increasingly 
affluent society might be expected to spend larger amounts of discretionary 
income on health care, and thereby increase demand.  Then, there are the 
difficult quality issues discussed above.  Payers may be willing to pay 
MedSouth doctors more money for fewer services simply because these 
doctors are better at deciding when services are necessary and get better results 
when they perform those services. 
Suppose you were to assume that the “service” the doctors are selling is 
not the provision of tests and procedures, but rather better health?  How do you 
put a price on that?  One proxy might be the amount of money that people have 
to spend on health care.  Over the long run, healthier people may require less 
medical attention, so the total costs per patient may decrease if the venture 
delivers superior care.  But, costs may increase in the short run with heavier 
reliance on preventive care.  And, of course, healthier people may still incur 
higher costs in the long run if they live longer.  At this point, heads begin to 
spin and it may be tempting to fall back on the traditional “market test” of 
increased consumer acceptance, demonstrated by increased market share.  This 
could indicate that the overall price-quality package of the group is appealing.  
However, as mentioned above, it could also mean association membership has 
grown because of the perceived advantages of collective bargaining. 
One way to avoid these ambiguities would be to focus instead on the 
elements of the association’s business plan and examine whether the members 
have done what they promised to do.  At least, this might help to sort out the 
extreme cases.  This test might show, on the one hand, that the promised 
“clinical integration” was simply a pretext to avoid per se condemnation.  At 
the opposite pole, the test might show the group has followed its plan with 
enthusiasm and has achieved widespread professional and customer approval.  
It is not unusual to rely on such opinion evidence when evaluating various 
business proposals.35  The tough cases, of course, will lie in the middle.  We 
need to recognize that doctors, like other providers of goods and services, may 
have mixed incentives both to improve their efficiency and their collective 
bargaining power.36 
 
 35. See David Scheffman, Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 
Sources of Information and Evidence in Merger Investigations, Address Before the ABA Section 
of Antitrust Law and the Association of the City of New York (June 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/scheffmanabanycbar.pdf. 
 36. See HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at § 8(B)(2). 
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C. Less Restrictive Alternatives 
A key finding in the staff opinion is the conclusion that joint contracting 
was closely related and essential to the success of the venture.37  This may be 
true in the sense that neither MedSouth nor other similar associations are likely 
to embark on such a promising experiment absent assurance they can bargain 
with payers as a group.  Another important element of the opinion is the 
finding that the venture will be non-exclusive.  This is not at all surprising.  It 
is standard antitrust doctrine that non-exclusive ventures are viewed more 
benignly than exclusive ventures.38  There is, however, an unacknowledged 
tension between the opinion’s findings on joint contracting and its reliance on 
non-exclusivity. 
The opinion advances two rationales in support of joint contracting.  First, 
it is asserted that “doctors need to be able to rely on the participation of other 
members of the group in the network and its activities on a continuing basis,” 
and joint contracting will assure this “continuing participation.”39  Joint 
contracting will surely reinforce this assurance, but non-exclusivity will surely 
undercut it.  Lawyers are familiar with this notion, too, as most law firms 
mandate exclusivity partly to assure availability. 
The opinion’s second rationale for joint contracting is that it will assure a 
more “equitable” distribution of returns among the members of the venture.40  
Again, this is surely important—if a few opportunistic prima donnas parlay the 
superior skills they acquire inside the venture to bargain for extraordinarily 
high individual fees, they not only “free ride” on the work of their colleagues, 
but detract from the customer appeal of the venture overall.  But, if these same 
prima donnas are free to contract on their own for high fees outside the 
venture, they also take a free ride and, of course, these outside engagements 
would tend to reduce their availability. 
In short, if joint bargaining is necessary, how can the venture tolerate non-
exclusivity?  Alternatively, if non-exclusivity is tolerable, what does this say 
about the need for joint bargaining?  It is entirely possible that some ventures 
like MedSouth will turn out to be substantially exclusive de facto, if not wholly 
exclusive de jure, and will have to be analyzed on that basis.   
Anomalies of this kind are not only present in the MedSouth opinion but 
also present in the broad body of antitrust doctrine.41  The thing distinguishing 
 
 37. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 38. See, e.g., COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at §§ 3.3, 3.34(a); HEALTH 
CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 3, at §§ 8(A), 8(B)(2) (different safety zones for exclusive and 
non-exclusive ventures and rule-of-reason analysis). 
 39. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 1. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Note, for example, the apparent anomaly that an agreement between two entities not to 
compete on a single aspect of competition (like price) will be per se illegal, but a merger that 
extinguishes competition entirely is subject to the rule of reason. 
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a bare cartel that is per se illegal from a legitimate joint venture is the presence 
of some degree of integration, which can potentially yield efficiencies.  The 
Health Care Statements recognize the efficiency-creating potential of both 
financial and clinical integration.  An exclusive joint venture would clearly 
have more of both.  On the other hand, it could raise competitive problems of a 
different kind. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I would like to conclude on a personal note.  This article, like a number 
that I have written, emphasizes complications and provides more questions 
than answers.  The reader should not conclude, however, that I disagree with 
the MedSouth Staff Opinion or that I believe a subsequent rule-of-reason 
inquiry would be too difficult to undertake. 
On the contrary, I believe that staff had no choice but to respond as it did.  
In California Dental,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed once more that 
government agencies cannot summarily condemn particular practices absent an 
extensive body of experience that would indicate they are almost invariably 
pernicious.  No such experience is available here.  Moreover, the MedSouth 
proposal is innovative and appears to offer the potential for improved medical 
care at lower costs.  The venture may not develop that way, but we cannot 
strangle it before it has a chance to develop. 
Similarly, the discussion of complications and anomalies does not signal 
any personal reluctance to proceed further in these matters in order to 
determine whether promised performance has been delivered and whether 
customers overall have been helped or hurt.  In fact, I believe we have an 
obligation to do so, lest our integration tests be treated as pure formalities.  All 
I am saying is that these cases—like so many others that we see—will be 




 42. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). 
